

The Forgotten HOMELAND

The task force report *THE FORGOTTEN HOMELAND* draws three major conclusions on the state of our preparedness at home: First, metropolitan areas should be the major focus of domestic security, including metropolitan response plans, medical systems, policing and intelligence efforts, and transportation security. Second, working with the private sector, government must increase security and reduce risk at privately owned facilities, attacks against which could create mass casualties or disrupt the operation of the economy. Third, there are certain functions that the federal government must perform better than it does today, including border and port security, aviation security, national-level intelligence, and catastrophic event response.

Below is a synopsis of the report's major ideas and policy recommendations:

I. A Metropolitan Approach to Homeland Security

Metropolitan areas should become the primary unit for planning, funding, and training for homeland security.

Every metropolitan area must complete vulnerability and mitigation assessments for every major component of security: First responders must be supplied with and trained in the use of personal protective equipment; interoperable communications must be established for all major metropolitan areas; realistic training and preparedness exercises must be conducted; evacuation routes and shelter-in-place plans must be developed and tested.

Metropolitan areas must move from being first responders to being first preventers. Congress should establish a COPS II first preventers program to hire and train local law enforcement to do counterterrorism and gather intelligence. Regional networks for information sharing must be established and integrated with state and local intelligence fusion centers for coordinating prevention, preparedness, and response activities with the states and municipal areas. All law enforcement officers and civilian analysts dedicated to counterterrorism and intelligence operations must be cleared at the top secret level to achieve adequate information exchange with their federal counterparts.

The security of public transportation systems must be bolstered while maintaining ease of use for passengers. Increasing the visibility of security personnel and the use of closed-circuit television systems is essential; making the public part of security efforts, as in the “if you see something, say something” campaigns, can provide a substantial increase in security. Interoperable communication systems

and robust command and control systems must be built to work in subway systems. Federal funds should be made available to support capital improvements that would help prevent attacks, mitigate effects, and facilitate rapid post-attack recovery of the transit system.

Public health and hospital plans should be developed in every major metropolitan area and funding should be targeted to our largest cities first. Detection systems for chemical and biological releases must be installed in subways and metro stations, convention and athletic centers, and other public areas where large numbers of people congregate. Syndromic surveillance systems should be established in all major metropolitan areas and linked to a federal network. Local agencies must have access to the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) formulary, and the program should be expanded to include treatment for radiation sickness and additional all-hazards materials. The Vendor Managed Inventory should be extended to include food, water, and other basic supplies; and the distribution plans for SNS material must be developed and drilled on.

II. A New Approach to the Private Sector

The overuse of “critical infrastructure” designations must be eliminated and narrower definitions of high-impact targets and essential systems adopted. Different standards of security should be set within each category, and different levels of federal support are appropriate. Infrastructure security plans that specify the end-state to be achieved, goals and milestones for achieving it, standards for implementation and compliance, and timelines for accomplishing intermediate actions should be set. Smart regulation on a sector-by-sector basis can be used to encourage the development and implementation of appropriate security measures. Congress should revamp the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) to promote risk mitigation and create a safe harbor against litigation following a terrorist attack where targeted companies have complied with government-approved security standards.


Congress must pass regulations to prevent a terrorist Bhopal. According to DHS planning scenarios, a truck bomb detonated at a chlorine plant could cause 17,500 deaths. Preventing such an outcome has relied largely on voluntary measures that are inadequate to deny terrorists these prime targets. Congress must mandate security, going beyond the industry's preference for loose standards and minimal enforcement. Regulating the industry should force the most dangerous facilities to either maintain security measures equivalent to those at nuclear power plants or switch processes to inherently safer technologies.

Cyber security must be made a national priority, and the federal government must use its convening power to standardize and coordinate private sector efforts. The White House must develop a new national information assurance policy directive to establish a framework for protecting critical cyber systems, clarify roles and responsibilities, and eliminate overlap. The number of committees nominally in charge of cyber security policy should be reduced to one under the reinstated position of cyber czar; Department of Defense indications and warnings efforts should be expanded into a national cyber attack sensing, warning, and response capability. Research and development efforts should be focused on the deployment of resilient networks; and sentencing guidelines for cyber crimes should be increased to reflect the damage they cause to our society and economy.

III. Fixing the Federal Role

Our disaster management system must be rebuilt starting with the reestablishment of FEMA as an independent cabinet-level agency. FEMA must be designated as the executive agent for federal disaster planning and liaison and coordination with state and local governments, and the lead agency for federal disaster crisis management in the field. FEMA must have the legal authority and capability to take over control and operations when local authorities are overwhelmed, disabled, or dispersed; it must help make cities “disaster-resistant” by invigorating Project Impact to ensure that local authorities have vital medical and interoperable mobile communications; and it must involve the private sector in planning and preparation for catastrophic events.

Port security efforts must go well beyond concern over the operation of marine terminals. The security of the global intermodal transportation system must be bolstered and a national port plan developed that takes into account long-term trade and security trends. The Department of Defense and the Coast Guard joint operations centers should be set up in all major U.S. commercial ports for surveillance and data sharing and for training local, state, and federal participants. The navy salvage fleet should be doubled and the ships repositioned to the East and West coasts; Coast Guard fleet modernization annual funding should be increased to \$2 billion; and all duties and fees collected in seaports should be allocated to fund security upgrades and infrastructure improvements.



Our border security cannot be ignored while the politics of immigration are sorted out. Amnesty and guest worker initiatives may be necessary tradeoffs in order to gain control of our borders. While a comprehensive assessment of the border is necessary, five imperatives are already clear: We must have strong physical barriers on the border with Mexico and the capability to monitor both the southern and northern border continually; agreement must be reached among the United States, Canada, and Mexico on asylum policies; counterfeit-proof visitor identification for guest workers and permanent aliens must be developed and deployed; workplace enforcement of immigration rules is essential; and radiation detection must be prioritized.

We must engage in a structured national discussion about the tradeoff between security and liberty led by the Civil Liberties Protection Board. Governors and mayors should consider appointing regional civil liberty protection boards to work with local police and other authorities; and outreach and educational activities in schools, civic organizations, places of worship, and local media should be undertaken. To ensure that the national Civil Liberties Protection Board is actively engaged in protecting civil liberties, it should issue a yearly report on its activities and on threats to civil liberties, brief Congress on the report, and hold an annual national conference to review its report. Moreover, the board should file a civil liberties impact statement with the executive branch and Congress on any proposed measure or program that may raise public concerns about potential abuses of liberty.

Security funding should not be segmented between “national security” and “homeland security.” The administration should be required to perform a Synoptic Security Review (SSR) encompassing both Pentagon and domestic security. Tradeoffs should be made between traditional defense spending and homeland security. Pentagon programs including the F/A-22 Raptor, the Virginia Class submarine, the DD(X) destroyer, the V-22 Osprey, and ballistic missile defense can be eliminated or scaled back. This would generate \$23.7 billion for public health and first responders, transportation security, port security, chemical plant security, and other priorities.

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